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SILENCE AT THE COURT: THE CURIOUS
ABSENCE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
CASES FROM CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Michael M, Berger*
What's a "regulatory takings case," and why should anyone care if
the California Supreme Court entertains such things or ignores them?
Good question. Easy answer.
The "takings" part of the phrase comes from the constitutional
command that private property not be taken for public use without just
compensation.' The "regulatory" aspect merely signifies that the taking
is alleged to have occurred through the impact of a governmental statute,
ordinance or regulation, rather than through acquisition or direct physical use of private property. All types of takings require compensation. 2
* J.D., 1967, Washington University School of Law; L.L.M., 1968, University of Southern California Law Center. The author is a shareholder in the Santa Monica law firm of
Berger & Norton. He believes, as the late Justice Douglas did, that people with "axes to
grind" should so note when they pontificate publicly, so their audience can know through what
color spectacles their advisors view the issues being discussed. See William 0. Douglas, Law
Reviews and Full Disclosure,40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 228-30 (1965). To this end, the author
notes the following. His practice is both procedurally and substantively specialized. Procedurally, he has been an appellate lawyer for most of the 26 years since he commenced life after law
school. He is a former President of the California Academy of Appellate Lawyers and served a
tour as Chairman of the State Bar's Committee on Appellate Courts. Substantively, his practice focuses on real property-more particularly, the issues raised by government actions
(ranging from public works operations through land use and zoning to land acquisition) that
implicate the just compensation commands of the state and federal constitutions. In that capacity, he represented the property owners in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990), and filed amicus
curiae briefs in support of the property owners in numerous cases, including Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522
(1992), and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), which help
define the substance of the law discussed in this Essay.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
2. As Justice Brennan explained:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to. promote the public
good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property.
From the property owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is
condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural
state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it.
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The importance of "regulatory takings cases" lies in the context
from which the cases arise. This category of cases is brought by the
property owners rather than the government. It contains a variety of
that type of litigation known as "inverse" condemnation.3 Such cases
have their genesis in a property owner's belief that some sort of governmental regulation has so adversely affected the ability to use property
that the property has been taken in the constitutional sense.
A list of the kinds of regulations that engender such feelings by
property owners demonstrates the breadth of the potential impact of this
litigation: endangered species;' wetlands; 6 historic preservation;7 rent
control;' a host of planning and zoning regulations dealing with such
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan's views in his dissenting opinion became the majority's rule in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding
that under Just Compensation Clause, land owner may recover damages when government has
taken property by land-use regulation).
3. Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to compel the sale of private property
for public use. Condemnation is the usual term applied to a government lawsuit to compel
acquisition. Inverse condemnation describes a suit brought by a property owner against the
government when the owner believes that his or her property has been taken but no proceedings have been instituted by the government and no payment has been tendered. The just
compensation guarantee is self-executing, thus permitting this type of suit. See United States
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 720, 123 P.2d 505, 510
(1942).
4. Even former President Nixon has gotten into the act. Recently, a federal court held
that the statute preventing Mr. Nixon from having greater access to his presidential papers
than other citizens was a taking of Mr. Nixon's property for which he was owed compensation.
Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
5. See Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114
(1989); Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 222 Cal. App. 3d 30, 271 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1990).
6. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990); Florida Rock
Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990).
7. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
8. In fairness, the California Supreme Court has reviewed a number of rent control cases
during this period. The issues, however, have generally focused on due process and equal
protection claims rather than takings claims. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365,
721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) (holding that rent control ordinance which burdened
some landlords by subsidizing low income tenants did not violate due process or equal protection), affld, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (affirming California Supreme Court holding that takings claim
was unripe); Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 256, 703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1985) (affirming constitutionality of ordinance regulating conversion of apartments to condominiums); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984)
(rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to city's rent control ordinance that
imposed standard for measuring rate of return), afftd, 475 U.S. 260 (1986); Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984) (rejecting due process
and Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude challenges to city ordinance that prevented
owner from demolishing apartments).
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issues as density of population;9 types of permissible land uses; 10 timing
of development;1 1 and the nearly limitless variety of conditions that can
be devised by regulators affecting permissive use of property, such as
easements for public passage, 12 dedications for public6 parks, 13 7and exac15
4
tions for public schools, 1 housing, transportation,' or art.'
As indicated by the subjects listed, cases arising out of a regulatory
takings claim usually generate a substantial amount of controversy. And
emotion. And they often involve large amounts of money.
For example, in order to preserve the habitat of a rare rodent-or a
butterfly nobody can remember having seen for a generation-a government agency tells the owners of thousands of acres of land that they cannot do anything on their land that will interfere with the indigenous
habitat. Controversy is sure to erupt between property owners and nature protectors. One must only note the ongoing dispute between lumber
companies (and their employees) and the protectors of the northern spotted owl.
Another example is provided by a United States Supreme Court case
concerning a New York City landmark preservation law. While the case
was being argued,' 8 the oral argument inside was accompanied outside
by a large crowd of picketers led by President Kennedy's widow. They
were protesting the idea that the owners of Grand Central Terminal
wanted the right to build an office tower over the historic structure-or
to be paid if the City wanted to preserve the local ambience uncluttered
by productive private use of privately owned property.
9. Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976).
10. Terminals Equip. Co. v. City & County of S.F., 221 Cal. App. 3d 234, 270 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1990); Twain Harte Assocs. v. County of Tuolumne, 217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 265 Cal. Rptr.
737 (1990).
11. Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1016, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 877 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); Griffin Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court,
229 Cal. App. 3d 991, 280 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1991) (depublished, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 519, 802 P.2d
1317, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (Jan. 29, 1992)); Gilbert v. State, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (1990).
12. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1993).
14. See, e.g., Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 3 Cal. App. 4th 320, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 897 (1992); Shappell Indus. v. Governing Bd., 1 Cal. App. 4th 218, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
818 (1991).
15. See Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
16. See Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City & County of S.F., 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 21 (1987).
17. See Paul J. Silvern, Negotiating the Public Interest: California'sDevelopment Agreement Statute, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1985, at 3.
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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For past generations, murky areas of the country were referred to as
"swamps." It was considered a good thing to fill those swamps so that
pests and health hazards could be eliminated, and the resulting dry land
could be put to beneficial use. More recently, however, it has been decided that these areas need to be preserved. They have metamorphosed
from "swamps" into "wetlands," and their protectors have become legion. 19 Property owners who discover that they own land which is partly
or entirely a "wetland," find themselves precluded from using their land
and feel compelled to sue the regulators for compensation. When they
do so, they are generally reviled as environmental despoilers-though
usually not in such gentle terms.
These cases also call into play some of the more selfish emotions in
human beings. They appear so regularly that the literature is filled with
references to the NIMBY-not in my back yard-and drawbridge-I'm
on board, so let's raise the drawbridge-syndromes. People suffering
from NIMBYism do not want "undesirable" land uses nearby. And
"undesirable" runs the gamut from toxic industrial sites to housing tracts
viewed as being too dense, or too affordable, or simply blocking the view.
Drawbridgers are often caricatured as environmentalists who already own their home in the hills. They relentlessly pressure legislative
bodies for protective legislation. Not being fools, legislators who must
repeatedly stand for reelection have recognized that these days there are
usually more people on the stop growth side than on the encourage
growth side. This is true in spite of the poor state of the economy. Politicians read the polls, and they know where the votes lie.20
Whatever the underlying reason, regulatory takings cases thus pit
property owners who want to make economically productive use of land
against regulators who have decided that their land must remain un- or
under-utilized. The legal issue is whether such prohibition can make the
property owner bear the cost of providing some public benefit-such as
preservation of owls, rodents, wetlands or uncluttered hillsides-or
19. The wetlands cases really get sticky when the land, as viewed on the surface by ordinary mortals, is not "wet" at all. Honest. The manner in which these regulations are drawn
make wetlands far more numerous than swamps ever were. Wetlands are defined by the type
of vegetation growing on them, the proximity of the underground water table to the surface
(not visible from the surface), and the duration of the closeness of the water table and the
surface. Using this loose definition, your backyard probably qualifies as a wetland. See Virginia S. Albrecht, The Wetlands Debate, URB. LAND, May 1992, at 20, 20-21 ("[A]n area can
be deemed a wetland if the water table rises to within 18 inches of the surface.").
20. See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction
Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gangof Five's" Views on Just Compensationfor Regulatory Taking
of Property, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 685, 700-02 (1986).
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whether government will have to buy the land to accomplish its regulatory goals.
Nearly three-quarters of a century ago, Justice Holmes character-1
2
ized the legal task as deciding whether the regulation goes "too far."
Although some efforts have been made, courts have not been able to improve on that amorphous phraseology. Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded that each case must be decided ad hoc, on its own
facts, and the Court repeatedly analyzes regulatory takings cases by returning to the first year property law professors' "bundle of sticks"
22
analogy.
As should be obvious, something in the broad range of regulations
under discussion affects everyone sooner or later. How the law accommodates these interests is significant. And, with the United States
Supreme Court doing its constitutional analysis by examining sticks and
twigs from the property rights bundle on an "ad hoc" basis, it would also
appear necessary to have some local judicial benchmarks along the way
(a bit more substantial than Hansel and Gretel's famous breadcrumbs) so
that all participants in the land-use planning process might have a clue as
to the location of the constitutional line.
If you have been reading the footnotes along with this text-or even
if you only glanced briefly at the bottom of the page-you may have
noticed one interesting thing about the preceding group of case citations:
almost none came from the California Supreme Court. Is that because
California cases lack interesting issues? I don't think so. Call me parochial, but I'll stack the interest in those issues-and the number of people
potentially affected by them-against some of the issues the California
Supreme Court has been deciding during that same time frame.2 3
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
22. See Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. &
49 (1985).

CONTEMP. L. 39, 46-

23. See, eg., Southwest Concrete Prods. v. Gosh Const. Corp., 51 Cal. 3d 701, 798 P.2d
1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1990) (holding that late charge on contract sale is not interest on
loan of money); Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990)
(determining meaning of "express" declaration needed to waive community property rights);
Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 47 Cal. 3d 456, 763 P.2d 1326, 253 Cal. Rptr.
236 (1988) (determining statute of limitations for action on mechanic's lien release); Shamblin
v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 749 P.2d 339, 243 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1988) (determining showing
needed to set aside default judgment); Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195,
219 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985) (holding that "ladies day" at car wash violated Unruh Civil Rights
Act); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 705 P.2d 886, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1985) (determining
when statute of limitations for medical malpractice begins to run); Spiritual Psychic Science
Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1985) (holding that fortunetelling is speech protected by First Amendment); T.M. Cobb Co.
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 273, 682 P.2d 338, 204 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1984) (holding that
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Has it been because of a lack of litigation in California? That
doesn't ring true either. Judging by the published opinions of the courts

of appeal, the California judiciary has been quite active.24 In fact, the
field of takings law has been something of a hotbed of litigation nationally for the last decade and a half, California has not been isolated from

this trend.25
Has it been because the issues presented in the California cases ha-

ven't seemed-for want of a better term-"review-worthy"? Aside from
the general interest and importance of takings law, the United States
Supreme Court appears to have plucked seven California regulatory takings cases from the bushels of certiorari petitions during that period.
Only one of the seven had received review by the California Supreme

Court on the regulatory takings issue.2 6 Even with the need to plow
through petitions from all over the country, arising in state, federal, territorial and military courts, the United States Supreme Court managed to
find that a substantial group of decisions by the California Courts of Ap-

peal contained issues, arguments or subject matters that merited further
examination.2 7
Has it been because the law developed by the California judiciary

has been so clear, straightforward and in harmony with the rest of the
country that there has been no reason for the state supreme court to
California Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer can be revoked); Becker v. S.P.V. Constr. Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 489, 612 P.2d 915, 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1980) (determining extent of judgment
enterable on default).
This lst is not intended to be exhaustive. Neither is the placement of any case in it
intended to denigrate the case or offend anyone. Each of these cases was undoubtedly important to its parties. It is even possible that the decision reviewed by the California Supreme
Court in some of these cases had been incorrect in the lower court. As the justices repeatedly
remind us, however, neither of these is the standard for review. Given the widespread impact
of some of the land-use/regulatory takings cases, including even one such case in the agenda
might have done at least as much good for California as another decision on default judgments
or statutes of limitation. And, with all respect, the number of people adversely affected is
probably greater than the number of those whose interests are impacted by either "ladies day"
or "fortunetelling."
24. Gerald F. Uelman, Publication and Depublicationof CaliforniaCourt of Appeal Opinions: Is the EraserMightier Than the Pencil? 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (1993).
25. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 5-12, 14-16.
26. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),
affidon other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). One of the rent control cases also received review
by both the United States and California Supreme Courts; however, the California decision did
not address the takings issue. Pennell v. City of San lose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228
Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986), afl'd, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
27. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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involve itself? Although some-including this commentator-would demur, that thought was at least possible before 1987. In mid-1987, however, the United States Supreme Court told the California judiciary-in
two different cases-that its decisions in this field were out of line with
the requirements of the United States Constitution and at serious odds
with the law applied in our sister states. Although some Californians
might not have agreed with them, these United States Supreme Court
comments are hard to ignore: "[T]he California courts have decided the
compensation question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment," 2 8 and "our conclusion on this point is consistent with the
approach taken by every other court that has considered the question,
with the exception of the California state courts."2 9
The California Supreme Court has managed to ignore the United
States Supreme Court. Since 1987 the California Supreme Court has not
granted review in a single regulatory takings case. Indeed, aside from the
rent control cases noted earlier, in the last decade and a half only one
regulatory takings case has received plenary consideration by the California Supreme Court. 0 Further, that case was decided so long ago, in
1979, that only one justice that decided the case remains on the court
today.
Let that sink in for a moment. We live in an era when other state
supreme courts are deciding numerous regulatory takings cases, 3 1 the
United States Supreme Court is hearing them on a regular basis,32 and
28. First English, 482 U.S. at 311.
29. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40 (citing numerous cases from throughout United States and
amicus curiae brief of National Association of Home Builders, which was written by author of
this Essay).
30. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372.
31. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981); Lamar Advertising v. City of Albany, 389 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1990); Ailes v.
Decatur County Area Planning Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Kempf v. Iowa City, 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987); Kasparek v. Johnson County
Bd., 288 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1980); Maryland Port Admin. v. QC Corp., 529 A.2d 829 (Md.
1987); Electro-Tech, Inc. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 445 N.W.2d 61 (Mich. 1989), cert denied,
493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976); J.E.D.
Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1981), partially overruled by Auburn v.
McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988); Seawall Assoc. v. City of N.Y., 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989); Pennsylvania N.W. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990); Allingham v. Seattle, 749 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1988); Orion Corp. v.
State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee, 112 S.
Ct. 1522; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; FirstEnglish,
482 U.S. 304; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); MacDonald,Sommer & Frates,477 U.S. 340; United States
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the lower California courts are maintaining a steady diet of them. Yet,
the last plenary review by the California Supreme Court was so long ago
that almost the entire membership of the California Supreme Court has
been transformed in the interim.
What are Californians supposed to think? Where do they turn for a
definitive statement of their state's law? Since 1987, when the United
States Supreme Court wiped California's jurisprudential slate clean of
holdings that were said to have misinterpreted the protection required by
the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause and to have been out
of step with the interpretations of all other states, one might have expected the California Supreme Court to fill that void and provide some
guidance since that time. Indeed, given the United State Supreme
Court's clear, double-barrelled message, intended to bring California's
decisions into harmony with the federal constitutional minimum, it
would have been appropriate for the California Supreme Court to
quickly provide guidance to the lower courts on how to apply the new
constitutionally required rules.
Actually, the United States Supreme Court's characterization of
pre-1987 California law as being "inconsistent" was rather tame. For
years, respected commentators-including those who represented governmental regulators or sympathized with them-stumbled over each
other in an effort to find the right pejorative term to describe the California situation. Their efforts put the California judiciary's holdings
through a gauntlet of invective ranging from "restrictive and extreme" 33
to "onerous" and "draconian""3 to "parroting constitutionally required"
language but devising a "rule in no-win language" 35 to "bizarre ' 36 to
creating such an anti-developer atmosphere that, rather than suing a municipality to obtain relief, "it would cost a lot less and save much time if
[the developer] simply slit his throat."37
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. 621; Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33. Benjamin A. Kudo, Nukolii: PrivateDevelopment Rights and the Public Interest, 16
URB. L. 279, 287 (1984).
34. David L. Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., July
1985, at 6, 6-7.
35. George A. Staples, Jr., Exaction-MandatoryDedications and Payments in Lieu of
Dedication, 1980 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 111, 119.
36. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 257

(1985).
37. Ia at 293.
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Thus, after being twice chastised in 1987, some corrective response-or, at least, acknowledgement-would have seemed appropriate. But that was not to be. No review has since been granted.

The California Supreme Court's decisional jurisprudence is thus all
pre-1987-actually, pre-1980-and unrelated to the more recent deci-

sions of the United States Supreme Court.3 Those older decisions give
neither lower courts nor litigants any inkling as to the California
Supreme Court's response to the United States Supreme Court's rulings

on issues of paramount federal constitutional law or any clue as to the
Court's views on how California's earlier appellate opinions have been
affected by FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and their progeny. 9
The result in the lower courts is predictable: confusion,' anarchy,41

chaos and conflicting decisions. 42
38. One northern California trial court put the issue bluntly:
The United States Supreme Court has made some rather startling pronouncement[s]
in this field of law that may cause our courts to rethink that [compensation is not a
constitutionally available remedy for property owners denied use of their land] ...
[W]e should be reminded a trialcourt is to enforce the law of the State of California
Gilbert v. State, No. 636481-0, slip op. at 4 (Alameda Sup. Ct. June 28, 1988), aff'd, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 234, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1990) (emphasis added).
Frankly, such jurisdictional blather has not been seen in print since the famous "states'
rights" declaration by the trial judge in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Compare it
yourself. The declaration is quoted in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion. Id. at 566
(Warren, J., concurring). One had hoped we were beyond such embarrassing, antebellum judicial parochialism.
39. This is no mere theoretical problem. In Gilbert v. State, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 253,
266 Cal. Rptr. 891, 902-03 (1990), the court of appeal agreed to consider federal cases in its
decision because the court found federal precedent "persuasive" on the takings issue. Id at
253-54, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 903. Please note that these cases-decided by the United States
Supreme Court as a matter of paramount federal law-were not viewed as binding, but merely
persuasive, as though the California courts had discretion to disregard them.
40. See Twain Harte Assocs. v. County of Tuolumne, 217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 83-84, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 737, 742-43 (1990) (" 'Bright line' precedent is not the prevailing jurisprudential norm
in this area of the law.").
41. In a case denied review in 1989, the trial court had this to say about the impact of
United States Supreme Court decisions: "[Y]ou're going to have to get ... this state to accept
the law of the United States Supreme Court. Nobody told me yet it has done [so]." Gilbert,
No. 636481-0, at 18.
42. Compare Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260,
277 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1991) (requiring site-specific evidence of burden created by landowner's
use and placing burden of proof on government) with Whalers' Village Club v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985) (upholding dedication of
easement based on non site-specific evidence of burden on public created by landowner's use),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 111 (1986) and Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura, 231
Cal. App. 3d 1016, 282 Cal. Rptr. 877 (placing burden of proof on landowner), review denied,
1991 Cal. LEXIS 4556 (Sept. 26, 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); compare Twain
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"So what?" you might ask. "Doesn't the just compensation guarantee appear in both state and federal constitutions so that you can get an

apt application of the concept by simply suing in federal court?" This is
a rational (albeit digressive) response, but one that has been eliminated in

these circumstances. In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decreed
that regulatory takings cases must be brought in state-rather than federal-courts.4 3 Federal court litigation is not ripe until a property owner

has sought compensation through state procedures. 4 As a consequence,
increasing numbers of these cases are being brought in the California
courts. The financial stakes are often high. The kinds of issues governments are now raising and the groups that regularly pressure them for

action (such as further expansion of the ever-growing lists of threatened
and endangered species supposedly requiring protection including, most
recently, a cockroach)4" are rapidly increasing and in need of attention.
Thus the California Supreme Court's guidance on what the California
Harte, 217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737 (holding that "open-space" zoning was taking)
with Pinheiro v. County of Marin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (holding
that "open-space" zoning was not taking); compare Gilbert, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (holding that water moratorium which effectively deprived landowner of economic
use of property was not compensable taking) with Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that refusal to hook up water resulted in compensable taking where landowner
was deprived of economic use of property); compare Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 642, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1989) (requiring owner to challenge validity of government
action before filing action for compensation), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990) with Preseault
v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (requiring landowner to sue for compensation under Tucker Act
before challenging validity of government action); compare First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (denying compensation
to landowner prohibited from rebuilding in flood zone enacted for public health and safety),
review denied, 1989 Cal. LEXIS 4224 (Aug. 25, 1989), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1056 (1990) with
McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that taking may be
compensable even if flood zone ordinance based on public health and safety reasons); compare
Guinnane v. San Francisco City Planning Comm'n, 209 Cal. App. 3d 732, 257 Cal. Rptr. 742
(holding that moratorium was not taking), review denied, 1989 Cal. LEXIS 3657 (June 7,
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936 (1989) with Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that moratorium was taking), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1404 (1991).
43. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985). Although it is theoretically possible to request that a federal court exercise its discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over a state law inverse condemnation claim if the state law
claim is attached to a valid federal law claim, see Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989), busy federal trial judges are generally not eager to try
cases they don't have to.
44. See generally Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in FederalLand Use Cases, or
How the Supreme Court Converted FederalJudges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 7-1 (discussing federal rule requiring state remedies for regulatory taking to be exhausted before federal suit becomes ripe).
45. See Maura Dolan, Endangered Species Act Battlesfor Its Own Survival, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1992, at Al.
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rules are now is indispensable for all participants in land-use planning
and regulation. As noted earlier, given the range of issues involved in
these cases, the number of people affected is quite substantial.
Yet, the California Supreme Court remains silent and aloof. Without clear guidance from the state's supreme court, confusion, unfairness
and anarchy will continue. That harms all and benefits none. It breeds
unpredictable litigation results, undermining confidence in the judicial
system.
The warning is oft-repeated that one who asks the gods for intervention plays a dangerous game and may be cursed by having a wish
granted. Whether one unleashes a demon, a genie or a court of last resort, the results are generally unpredictable.
Nonetheless, we are Californians. Our jurisprudence is shaped by a
legal system led by the California Supreme Court. One primary reason
for having a "supreme" court is that there is only one such entity. Lower
courts can differ, but the ultimate decision-making responsibility lies
with the supreme court. Regardless of one's political or philosophical
leanings or desires, neither trial nor appellate judges are fungible. Given
the number of these judges in California, it is not surprising that they
regularly express different views about the same issue.
Someone needs to lay down the law. Like it or not, that someone is
the California Supreme Court. As long as the California Supreme Court
leaves lower courts with the impression that their decisions will not be
reviewed, each court of appeal will be free to decide cases according to its
view of the law. And as long as the California Supreme Court remains
silent, litigants will feel that all issues remain open. After all, the current
supreme court has not grappled with any of them.
Why the reticence? That is a question that can only be answered by
others. If I had a vote, however, I'd say it's time to end the drought.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly spoken on the takings
issue. If the teachings of those decisions are to be incorporated into California law, it will only be at the tutelage of the California Supreme Court.
Too many refuse to accept anything less as being final.
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